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16 Judicial review of Commission Decisions
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Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alessandro Morini
This chapter focuses on annulment procedures brought against 
Commission Decisions under Article 263 TFEU.1 Refl ecting the rapid 
evolution of key aspects of this litigation, it illustrates and contextualises 
the background and origins of the problems the case law attempts to 
address (I) and proposes paths to simplifi cation and rationalisation of the 
developments of the past years with regard to standing (II) as well as the 
extent of judicial review (III)2 before drawing general conclusions for 
the future role of general principles of law (IV) in this area. The chapter 
shows the increasing importance of information- related general principles 
of law in this fi eld.
I. BACKGROUND
Judicial review is an essential aspect of ensuring accountability of the 
exercise of public power as well as legality of administrative activity, 
especially, fi rstly, given that State aid Decisions are often taken in politi-
cally highly sensitive areas aff ecting inter alia Member State tax systems, 
regional policies or incentives for social developments, to name just a 
few. The importance of eff ective judicial review arises also, secondly, 
from the fact that in State aid cases the Commission decides in the 
context of an investigative and not an adjudicative procedure, requiring 
comparatively strict oversight over the exercise of far reaching powers 
conferred on it.
Judicial review in State aid cases, however, takes place in the context 
of asymmetric information. By nature of the procedural arrangements, 
the Commission will be made aware by a Member State only of the main 
issues of an intended aid but an economic and a legal assessment of such 
planned aid requires near full information about the conditions and the 
potential eff ect on the markets. Judicial review of Commission Decisions, 
in turn is based on Courts obtaining suffi  cient information about these 
factors and the Commission Decision in response to it, in order to exercise 
its review. The more intense the degree of review with regards to the facts 
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and law of the case, the more a Court will require detailed information 
about the background and motivation of a Commission Decision.
In State aid law, limitations on available information are intensifi ed 
through a procedure favouring the relation between the Commission and 
the Member States. Provision of information through Member States may 
be partial and biased, since a Member State generally has an interest in a 
specifi c outcome of the procedure.3 Private parties such as benefi ciaries, 
their competitors and trade associations are virtually excluded from the 
preliminary phase of investigation. They enjoy procedural rights, which 
allow them to learn about the details of an investigation and submit their 
views only in the context of an in- depth investigation under Article 108(2) 
TFEU.4 Member States are thus initially the most valuable source of 
information for the Commission, which in the fi rst phase is deprived of the 
contribution of private parties.
In summary, many of the concrete problems in the area of the State 
aid litigation arise from problems related to the gathering and use of 
information. The issue of information re- appears throughout this chapter 
as a central theme in considerations on understanding and improving 
 procedural provisions and judicial review in the State aid arena.
II.  LITIGATION AGAINST WHAT BY WHOM? ACTS 
AND STANDING
In State aid litigation against institutions, standing problems are rife. 
The reason is the very defi nition of Article 263, fourth paragraph TFEU 
requiring that any non- privileged actor display that an individual act or 
regulatory act which does not require further implementing measures 
is of direct and individual concern to them.5 To be able to navigate the 
complexities of judicial review of Commission Decisions in State aid, two 
major preliminary aspects have to be understood: fi rst, the question what 
kind of acts or non- acts can be subject to an action for annulment. This is 
becoming increasingly diffi  cult to discern given the capacity of measures 
which are not formally Decisions to aff ect individuals. Second, the ques-
tion of standing in which the ever- increasing complexity of the case law 
must be critically reviewed with regard to legal certainty.6 We shall address 
these two related aspects separately.
II.i Acts subject to judicial review
Many of the problems in reviewability of acts and standing stem from the 
distinction in State aid procedure between preliminary examination and 
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formal investigation. Whilst the fi rst of these phases aims at allowing the 
Commission to form a prima facie opinion on the case, the second actually 
recognises the rights of third parties, thereby having the eff ect also of wid-
ening the breadth of information to the Commission.7 Given the formal 
absence of procedural rights in the phase of preliminary examination and 
the almost total lack of information obligations in favour of third parties,8 
the major issues in this area appear to stem from Decisions refusing the 
opening of a formal investigation. Accordingly, the position of complain-
ants,9 mainly competitors to the benefi ciary of the aid, is particularly 
weak. This remarkably contrasts with the vital role played by these parties 
within the procedure.10
II.i.a. Opening and closing of procedural steps
The developments of protection of rights of individuals in various steps 
of the procedure, especially closing a procedure prior to the opening of 
a formal investigation, have always been problematic. Even before the 
adoption of Regulation 659/1999,11 State aid investigation procedures were 
defi ned as taking place more or less exclusively between the Commission 
and Member States. The CJEU was instrumental in defi ning this position, 
for example, in Sytraval in which it held that ‘decisions adopted by the 
Commission in the fi eld of State aid,’ were addressed exclusively to the 
Member States.12 A consequence of this is that in the fi eld of State aid 
the Decision addressed to a Member State could not be considered as an 
implicit rejection of a complaint by an individual. Although the CJEU 
thereby confi rmed Plaumann, requiring proof of direct and individual 
concern, its approach may be problematic in view of the IBM case law.13 
Under the latter test, acts adopted by the EU institutions are reviewable, if 
they are binding on and capable of aff ecting the interests of the applicant 
by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position. In order to deter-
mine the capacity of an act to be reviewed, the EU judicature looks at the 
substance of a contested act, in lieu of the form, as well as the intention of 
its author.14
Under Regulation 659/1999, the situation has become more complex. 
For example, the Commission is required to examine, without delay, 
the information made available by a complaint,15 and conclude the pre-
liminary examination by means of a Decision.16 This has prompted the 
EU judicature to apply the IBM doctrine in order to ascertain the nature 
of the act adopted by the Commission to conclude the phase of prelimi-
nary examination. Consistently, the General Court in Deutsche Bahn17 
has reviewed the acts addressed to the complainant examining whether 
the Commission adopted a reasoned and defi nitive position on the State 
measure, in conformity with the requirements of IBM.18 The crucial point 
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in the reasoning of the General Court is that where the Commission had 
expressly held in a letter addressed to the complainant that the State 
measure did not constitute aid, this would imply that the Commission 
had actually taken a Decision clearing the measure in the sense of Article 
4(2) of Regulation 659/99, and that such Decision is contained in the 
letter made subject to judicial review. In its case law, the General Court 
also underlines the exceptional nature of the reviewability of the letters 
addressed to complainants, explaining that review of these was necessary 
in case of the absence of a Decision addressed to the Member State.19 
Should the Commission have adopted one, the complainant would be 
required to challenge the Commission Decision directed at the Member 
State and not the letter of information.20 Where therefore an explicit deci-
sion towards the Member State exists, a letter to the complainant should 
be considered as a simple letter communicating that, according to the 
available information, there are no suffi  cient grounds for the Commission 
to take a view on the issue.21
While such interpretation of the procedural law in State aids appears 
to be deeply infl uenced by the confi guration of the State aid procedure as 
taking place between Commission and Member States, it does not seem to 
fully comply with the actual rationale designed by the European lawmaker 
in Regulation 659/1999. The obligation enshrined in Article 10(1) of 
Regulation 659/99 appears to be focused on a precise and strict duty of dil-
igent investigation,22 which requires the Commission to thoroughly review 
and carefully analyse all information provided by the complainant, as 
well as by all other sources.23 Similarly, Article 13(1) of Regulation 659/99 
urges the institution to conclude its assessment by means of Decision.24 
The two provisions appear to be the poles of a decision- making mecha-
nism based on an adequate stream of information, whereby complainants 
occupy an important position as sources. In light of this, not appears to 
exist for a conclusion of the procedure other than by a Decision under 
Article 4 of Regulation 659/99.
More recently, in this context, the CJEU (in Athinaïki Techniki) seems 
to have considered that preliminary examination must in any case be con-
cluded by a Decision of the Commission. By acknowledging the review-
ability of the refusal of the Commission to open a formal investigation, the 
Court also appears to consider that such a Decision may infringe upon the 
rationale of the State aid procedure. The rules governing the treatment of 
complaints, as provided in Articles 10(1) and 13(1) of Regulation 659/1999 
actually aim at ensuring that the Commission examines and takes a Decision 
on the allegedly unlawful State measure, thereby clearing the aid, or, where 
necessary, opening a formal investigation over it.25 The logic springing from 
such provisions refl ects the awareness of the risk that the determination not 
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to investigate in- depth the State measure might actually entail that unlawful 
new aid is granted, as a consequence of the Commission’s failure to prop-
erly assess the information in its possession. Therefore, given the possibility 
that the State measure concerned actually is State aid, in view of the Court, 
the Commission could not close the examination by simply informing the 
complainant of the lack of all the necessary information to take a Decision. 
Conversely, the Commission is called to actively cooperate with the com-
plainant, in order to reduce such informational gap. Thus, where the infor-
mation provided by a complainant is insuffi  cient for the Commission to 
take a view on an issue, it would be required to invite the complainant to 
supply additional comments.26 According to the Court, such obligation 
results from Article 20(2) of Regulation 659/99. This approach overturns 
previous case law interpreting Article 20(2) as allowing the Commission to 
close the procedure by means of a simple communication.
In conclusion, the fi nding of such a new obligation can be seen as aiming 
at reinforcing the stream of information initiated by the submission of the 
complaint, in order to put the institution in the position to adopt a deci-
sion defi nitively clearing the State measure or, where serious doubts exist 
as to the compatibility of the Decision, opening formal investigations. 
Importantly, the Court appears to be fully aware that the weak posi-
tion of complainants during preliminary examinations could aff ect their 
role as sources of precious information for the procedure.27 Therefore, in 
Athinaïki Techniki the Court consolidated the position of complainants by 
acknowledging that these, as parties concerned, ‘have a right to be associ-
ated with [the proceedings] in an adequate manner taking into account the 
circumstances of the case at issue’.28 Even if such statement does not entail 
the recognition of any status during preliminary examinations, undoubt-
edly it represents an important step forward in the consideration of third 
parties’ rights in that phase.
II.i.b. Old and new aid
The construction of the State aid procedure so far described appears to apply 
in principle only to cases where information has been adopted on allegedly 
unlawful new aid. As the General Court clearly stated in NDSHT,29 Article 
13(1) of Regulation 659/99 actually prescribes that the Commission adopts 
a Decision only with respect to new aid, thereby excluding existing aid 
from the application of these procedural requirements.30 The role of com-
plainants as information suppliers in the course of State aid proceedings 
is incompatible with the discretion the Commission generally enjoys when 
handling existing aid.31 In turn, such a diff erent attitude towards existing 
aid is justifi ed in the light of the fact that it is presumed that the aid already 
has been assessed on the basis of all relevant information.
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However understandable this distinction on the legal point may be, the 
reasoning of the General Court does not seem consistent with the judg-
ments rendered in the fi eld of unlawful new aid. Firstly, the fact that, upon 
a complaint the Commission qualifi es the State measure as existing aid 
appears to be a reasoned and defi nitive position of the type envisaged in 
Deutsche Bahn.32 Nothing seems to oppose application of the latter judg-
ment to the facts of NDSHT.
Secondly, the approach of the General Court appears particularly 
restrictive where compared to the attitude shown by the CJEU in Athinaïki 
Techniki. The reasons underlying the judgment in the latter case actually 
appear to be fully applicable to the facts in NDSHT: a broader involve-
ment of the complainant in the procedure could contribute decisively to 
improve the stream of information. This, in turn, would help in clarify-
ing whether the measure is existing or illegal new aid. The application 
of the reasoning in Athinaïki Techniki does not appear inconsistent with 
the qualifi cation of the State measure as existing aid. Consistently, the 
General Court could have urged the Commission to adopt a proac-
tive stance, thereby requiring further information to the complainant. 
Conversely, however, the General Court endorsed the traditional interpre-
tation of Article 20(2) of Regulation 659/99, which allows the Commission 
to close preliminary investigations for not enjoying all the information 
necessary to take a view on the issue. This conclusion is in contrast with 
the CJEU approach in Athinaïki Techniki, which, before the General 
Court’s decision in NDSHT,gave quite a diff erent interpretation of the 
aforementioned provision.33 If the distinction between new and existing 
aid can partially justify the diff erent outcome, it does not appear to allow 
for such a diff erent interpretation of a provision of the EU legislation. This 
clearly contrasts with the principle of legal certainty, which the General 
Court itself appears to carefully respect in this area of law.34
Thirdly, the approach of the General Court regarding existing aid, as 
expressed in NDSHT, appears also to be not compatible with that of the 
CJEU on the same issue. In CIRFS, for example, the Court held that 
the decision to classify an aid as existing aid, thereby taking the view that 
the aid was not subject to the prior notifi cation procedure provided for by 
Article 108(3) TFEU, is a fi nal refusal to initiate the procedure provided 
for by Article 108(2) TFEU.35 On this basis, it rejected the Commission’s 
argument qualifying the act as a preparatory measure, which, as such, 
could not have been subject to judicial review.36
II.i.c. Reviewability of informative acts
Informative acts exist in many forms under the title of: Guidelines, 
circulars, disciplines and others. Information tools have gained great 
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signifi cance for national authorities.37 The General Court has confi rmed 
the Commission’s competence to adopt such guidelines, as ‘such measures 
refl ect the Commission’s desire to publish directions on the approach it 
intends to follow’.38 Such acts have a particular importance in the area 
of State aid, in that they codify the rules evolved in day- to- day practice 
relating to the exercise by the Commission of the powers conferred on 
it by Article 108 TFEU.39 This does not make them generally subject to 
judicial review in themselves. They may indirectly be reviewed through 
individual cases.40 The situation will diff er, as the example of CIRFS 
shows, where the discipline was not simply a unilateral tool established by 
the Commission but was more akin to an agreement concluded between 
the Commission and certain Members States. The Court concluded 
from this that the ‘discipline,’ which was contained in a letter sent by the 
Commission to the Member States, had binding legal eff ects.41 Where 
‘the rules set out in the discipline and accepted by the Member States 
themselves have the eff ect, inter alia, of withdrawing from certain aid 
falling within its scope the authorisation previously granted and hence of 
classifying it as new aid and subjecting it to the obligation of prior noti-
fi cation’.42 Information plays the key part in understanding this reason-
ing. While a binding agreement such as that in CIRFS can be subject to 
judicial review, mere unilateral information about future intentions of the 
Commission cannot.
II.ii. Standing
While privileged actors like Member States generally do not face any spe-
cifi c diffi  culties with regard to standing,43 individual parties (such as ben-
efi ciaries and competitors to the benefi ciary) or sub- national legal persons 
(regions, local bodies and authorities), have to prove their direct and 
individual concern. The very specifi c relation between the Commission 
and the Member States, who are offi  cially the parties to a State aid pro-
cedure, poses its specifi c problems to individuals with respect to stand-
ing. Individual concern by a private individual is, in the case law of the 
Courts, generally accepted in two sets of circumstances: either, where a 
Commission Decision aff ects them by reason of certain attributes which 
are particular to the individual, or, where circumstances diff erentiate and 
distinguish an individual in the same way as a person would be when 
being the direct addressee of a Decision.44 Particular criteria have been 
developed in the area of State aid review in order to adapt this general 
approach to the peculiar substantial and procedural features of the policy 
area. State aid case law on standing often tends to focus on the evaluation 
of the economic impact of the proposed aid.
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II.ii.a. The position of benefi ciaries of aid and of competitors
Sketched in broad strokes, recipients of aid are considered to be substan-
tially aff ected by the Decision adopted declaring the aid incompatible at 
the end of an Article 108 (2) TFEU procedure.45 As already observed, 
benefi ciaries also enjoy standing with respect to decisions to open formal 
investigations, insofar as the examination concerns unlawful new aid, in 
which case the extension of the standstill obligation46 entails substantial 
eff ects on the economic sphere of the aid recipients.47 On the contrary, a 
Decision opening a formal investigation concerning existing aid does not 
entail any substantial change in their situation, because here the standstill 
obligation actually does not apply. Consequently, benefi ciaries must show 
a specifi c interest to challenge it. Finally, benefi ciaries of aid generally do 
not enjoy standing vis- à- vis Decisions not to open a formal investigation, 
as such Decision entails the grant of the aid. However, in the event that the 
State measure was qualifi ed as aid, though compatible, benefi ciaries might 
be interested in furthering the proceedings, in order to obtain a decision 
that the Commission completely clears the measure from the qualifi cation 
of aid. In this case, benefi ciaries are required to prove that they have a 
vested and present interest in the proceedings.48
The position of competitors appears weaker than that of benefi ciaries. 
For the purpose of standing, it may be more diffi  cult for competitors both 
to prove their competitive position and to show that they are individu-
ally concerned by a Commission’s Decision clearing the State measure. 
The burden of the Plaumann case law would be particularly diffi  cult to 
bear during the phase of preliminary examination due to the absence of 
procedural rights of complainants and the extremely limited informa-
tion available. The lack of information of the complainant appears to be 
particularly severe. Information accessible to the complaining competitor 
is necessarily limited to the elements which have been communicated by 
and exchanged with the Commission in the dialogue which followed the 
submission of the complaint. In principle, the State aid procedure does not 
provide for any form of publication of either notifi ed aid or the carrying 
out of preliminary examinations, subsequent to the submission of a com-
plaint. Decisions not to open formal investigations are published only as 
a summary notice,49 while the complainant enjoys a right to be informed 
of such a Decision.50 Upon acknowledgment of such weakness, the Court, 
in the case law Cook and Matra, has elaborated a more lenient test for the 
standing of competitors vis- à- vis Decisions not to open formal investiga-
tions.51 Accordingly, competitors (as well as other third parties) may enjoy 
standing against decisions not to open a procedure under Article 108(2) 
TFEU, insofar as these can prove to be concerned parties according to 
the meaning of Article 108(2) TFEU.52 Competitors may thus avoid the 
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burdensome test of Plaumann and challenge the decision not to give suite 
to the proceedings, where they claim the existence of serious diffi  culties 
as to the qualifi cation of the measure. The more lenient Cook and Matra 
test appears therefore as a remedy found against the peculiar information 
constraints that a complainant has to bear in the preliminary examination 
phase.
Crucially, the reasoning laying down the construction of such a lenient 
standing test is deeply rooted in the acknowledgement that the complain-
ant is not in the position to be fully aware of the particular features of 
the case. Thus, the complainant could not be able to substantiate why its 
position is individually concerned is the Decision.53 The test elaborated in 
Cook and Matra is thus based on such acknowledgement of the diffi  cul-
ties of obtaining information, which the complainant itself has to bear. 
Furthermore, this appears to respond to the same logics of the (already 
described) case law on reviewability of the Commission’s decisions. The 
lenient test for standing actually allows for the judicial review of the 
Commission Decision not to look in- depth into the State measure. By 
means of the application against such Decision, the Courts are able to 
assess the existence of serious diffi  culties as to the compatibility of the 
measure with the common market.54
II.ii.b. The complex role of the parties’ pleas for the defi nition of standing
Notwithstanding the undeniable goodwill of the Court, the application of 
the Cook and Matra test for standing has shown itself to be complex. This 
is true especially vis- à- vis the relationship between the specifi c requests of 
the parties, as expressed in the pleas, and the determination of the subject- 
matter of the application. The subject- matter is actually defi ned by the 
specifi c pleas that the parties submit in their applications for annulment. 
In general, the parties are obliged to forward pleas supporting their case 
and to select the arguments to support the pleas. However, the subject- 
matter of an application for the annulment of a Decision ending the phase 
of preliminary examination is strictly infl uenced by the particular nature 
of the Decision challenged.55
Even if the Commission is substantially called to carry out the same 
evaluations required in the phase of formal investigations, the examina-
tion is only preliminary, that is, aimed at letting the institution form a 
prima facie opinion.56 The Commission is actually urged to open the phase 
of formal investigation where there are doubts as to the compatibility of 
the measure with the common/internal market, unless no such doubts are 
raised as to the fact that the measure is not an aid, or its compatibility 
with the common/internal market.57 Thus, the subject- matter of an appli-
cation for the annulment of a Decision not to open formal investigations 
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is necessarily limited to the review of the potential existence of serious 
diffi  culties to determine the compatibility of the aid measure. As a con-
sequence, the main purpose of the parties in challenging such a decision 
should be no more than to obtain the opening of a formal investigation, in 
order to be put in a position to exert the procedural rights conferred upon 
them by Article 108(2) TFEU.58
Therefore, the specifi c requests presented by the parties in their appli-
cation against a Decision not to open a formal investigation must aim at 
proving that serious diffi  culties exist as to the compatibility of the aid, 
thereby compelling the Commission to look more thoroughly into the 
State measure.
A look to the case law shows that the requests of the parties are generally 
broader than such a defi nition of the subject- matter, as they include pleas 
ranging from the claim of infringement of the procedural rights, to issues 
of substance, such as the application of Article 108(1) and (3) TFEU.59 
Such a wide range of pleas is comprehensible, given that the Commission 
clears the aid with a Decision similar in content to the Decision adopted 
at the end of formal investigations. However, as the subject- matter of the 
dispute is limited, the scope of the judicial review also will be restricted to 
verifying the existence of serious diffi  culties and ought not to be extended 
to a full review of the issues of substance. This should actually take place 
only once a decision has been adopted following the opening of formal 
investigations. Otherwise, the Courts would go beyond the determination 
of the existence of serious diffi  culties and review the Commission’s assess-
ment in light of Article 108(1) and (3) TFEU. Thereby they would eff ec-
tively replace the potential future Commission decision with their own. 
This was clearly stated in the Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi of 
17 July 2008 in British Aggregates Association:
[there is] a need to ensure that, where an action is brought by a person who is 
simply relying on his status as a concerned party within the meaning of [Article 
108(2) TFEU], the [Union] judicature’s review of the contested decision does 
not go beyond what is needed to ensure that the procedural rights conferred 
by that provision are complied with. That would be the case where, rather 
than merely determining whether the conditions justifying non- initiation of the 
formal investigation procedure were satisfi ed – namely the absence of serious 
diffi  culties in classifying the measure as aid and/or in assessing its compat-
ibility with the common market – the [Union] judicature were to establish 
the existence of State aid (or of individual elements of State aid which the 
Commission had found to be lacking), or to fi nd that the conditions relied 
upon by the Commission, in declaring the aid compatible with the Treaty, 
were not satisfi ed. In such circumstances, the applicant would in fact, secure 
not only initiation of the formal investigation procedure, where appropri-
ate, but the additional result that the Commission would be bound by those 
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fi ndings on the part of the [Union] judicature and the substance of the deci-
sion to be adopted on conclusion of that procedure would, in part at least, 
be predetermined; that is to say, the applicant would have brought about the 
predetermination of a decision which it would not have been entitled to chal-
lenge solely by virtue of its status as a ‘concerned party’ within the meaning of 
[Article 108 (2) TFEU].60
In order for the lenient test to apply, the CJEU actually therefore 
requires that the parties expressly aim at securing the procedural rights 
provided for in Article 108 (2) TFEU, thereby obtaining the opening of 
formal investigations. This implies that the locus standi in State aid cases 
under Article 263 TFEU is therefore dependent on the pleadings of the 
applicant. Accordingly, these could gain standing only where, in the 
application, they expressly plead for the protection of their procedural 
rights.61
One consequence of this stance is that, where no pleas on this point are 
formulated in the application, the Courts could not construe the other 
ones advanced by the parties as they were conceived to obtain the opening 
of formal investigations.62 The CJEU therefore aims at determining the 
subject- matter by channelling the formulation of the pleas with express 
references to the protection of procedural rights. This appears to have 
clarifi ed the somewhat inconsistent case law of the General Court, which 
has sometimes rejected applications lacking any such plea as inadmis-
sible,63 while on another occasion granting it on the basis of a teleological 
reading of the other pleas.64
A second consequence results from the specifi c relationship existing 
between the diff erent pleas advanced by the parties. In particular, if appli-
cants advance grounds both on infringement of procedural rights and 
on substance, two diff erent tests appear to apply in order to determine 
their admissibility. Standing in respect of substantial grounds follows the 
Plaumann test, whereas the more lenient Cook and Matra test applies to 
pleas relating to procedural rights.65 Consideration of the already men-
tioned lack of information of third parties necessary to meet the test of 
Plaumann is evident from the fact that, should demonstration of the indi-
vidual concern fail, standing could be granted under the Cook and Matra 
test.66
Maintaining the parallel tests for standing of Cook and Matra, and 
Plaumann responds to the EU judicature’s intention to limit the subject- 
matter in preliminary examinations. As the already well- stressed lack of 
suffi  cient information renders it diffi  cult to meet the Plaumann test for 
standing, the parties are much more likely to challenge the Commission’s 
Decision arguing infringement of procedural rights. This will entail the 
admissibility of the application and, at the same time, the limitation of 
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proceedings to the assessment of the existence of serious diffi  culties in the 
determination of the compatibility of the State measure.
Importantly, the CJEU has clarifi ed that failure to meet the Plaumann 
test does not rule out the application of Cook and Matra.67 In accordance 
with this, should the applicant fail the test in Plaumann, it will always 
be possible to obtain standing under the more lenient test in Cook and 
Matra. This, however, still leaves open the question of the relationship 
between the diff erent pleas presented by the parties. In particular, it is 
not clear whether failure to meet Plaumann, should bring the courts to 
automatically drop the pleas on substance. Recent case law of the General 
Court, for example in Kronoply, seems to indicate that although failure to 
meet Plaumann implies the inadmissibility of pleas on merits, the latter 
could nonetheless be used by the EU judicature in order to determine the 
subsistence of serious diffi  culties in determining the compatibility of the 
aid with the common market thus warranting the opening of the second 
phase.68
This case law raises the question of a lack of consistency, and even of 
equity in the treatment of complainants, as based on the diff erent requests 
they advance in their pleas. If preserving the consistency of the subject- 
matter of the application, while, at the same time, granting applicants a 
lenient standing test, constitutes a reasonable ground to frame the Cook 
and Matra case law, such choice also implies a heavier burden on appli-
cants. In particular, applicants’ lawyers must actually be very careful in 
shaping the application as, under the current case law, failure to claim 
infringement of procedural rights practically implies the obligation to 
satisfy the stricter Plaumann test. Furthermore, as Advocate General 
Sharpston has rightly pointed out, it is diffi  cult to see how an applicant 
could avoid being drawn into arguments about the merits of a Decision 
‘[. . .] when seeking to show that there were still serious diffi  culties remain-
ing in the Commission’s initial assessment of the aid in issue (.  .  .). It is 
all too easy for them to slip and fi nd that they are either trapped by the 
stricter Plaumann test, or that they have not done enough to satisfy the 
Court that there were indeed procedural errors in the decision they wish 
to contest’.69
II.ii. c. Legal position of an applicant
As to what more precisely concerns the test enshrined in Plaumann, and 
applied by the CJEU to verify the standing of applicants advancing pleas 
on substance, the applicant must,70 in general, demonstrate that its legal 
position is aff ected. The benefi ciaries of aid schemes have locus standi 
where they are the actual benefi ciaries of the aid in question.
It may appear at fi rst sight that in State aid cases brought by competitors, 
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the Court has been comparatively lenient with respect to the standing 
requirements of the applicant’s legal position being aff ected. Instead the 
focus seems to have developed towards giving more weight to procedural 
and economic considerations than to the more dogmatic defi nition of 
direct and individual concern applied in other policy areas.71 In particular, 
competitors aff ected only by their competitive relationship to a recipient 
of aid must not only demonstrate that their market position as competi-
tor is aff ected in some distant way, but corroborate that the market posi-
tion was ‘substantially’ aff ected by demonstrating the ‘magnitude and 
prejudice’ of the aid ‘to its market position.’72 This does not yet answer the 
question to whether any type of actual or potential competitive relation-
ship between the recipient of an aid and a third party might be suffi  cient to 
grant standing against a Decision.
The case law of the CJEU confi rms that the competitive relationship 
is the criterion also to be applied to parties who had been involved in 
the procedures during a second phase in- depth review of a proposed aid, 
mentioning explicitly ‘the persons, undertakings or associations whose 
interests might be aff ected by the grant of the aid, in particular competing 
undertakings and trade associations’.73 A competitor will then have stand-
ing if he played an active role in the procedure, provided that his market 
position is signifi cantly aff ected by the aid which is the subject of the con-
tested Decision.74
The case law since Cofaz has clarifi ed that the competitive relation-
ship needs to be qualifi ed to fulfi l the criteria of individual concern under 
Article 263(4) TFEU. The mere fact that a contested Decision may have 
an eff ect on the competitive relationship is in itself not suffi  cient even if 
the party had been participating in a formal investigation.75 The claim-
ant additionally has to show itself to be individually concerned in a way 
similar to an addressee of a Decision.76 Individual concern will be denied 
if the position of the applicant in the relevant market is not substantially 
aff ected by the aid in question.77 Several factors can be identifi ed in the 
case law as being relevant in that respect. First, the Court will have to 
analyse the market situation in question. Only an analysis of the overall 
market situation will, in its view, allow demonstration of a substantial 
adverse eff ect on a competitor’s position. It cannot, the CJEU states, be 
‘simply a matter of the existence of certain factors’ indicating a decline in 
the commercial or fi nancial performance of one competitor due to the aid 
granted to another.78
The overall analysis of the market will consist inter alia of factors such 
as the number of producers which are in competition to another, the 
smaller the number, the more likely the eff ect. In Lenzing, for example, 
the Court granted standing fi nding that the relevant viscose market was 
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characterised by ‘a very small number of producers and by serious pro-
duction overcapacity’ increasing the signifi cance of the distortive eff ect of 
an aid granted to one of the few producers in the market.79 In ARE on the 
other hand, an association of small businesses and former land owners, 
despite having actively participated in a formal investigation, could not 
show to be individually concerned due to the competitive situation they 
were in. The Court found that a very large number of competitors, in fact, 
‘all farmers in the EU’ could be regarded as competitors of the benefi ciar-
ies of the land acquisition scheme’ applied under German law.80 Similarly, 
in Italy and Sardegna the Court held, that a company could not contest ‘a 
Commission decision prohibiting a sectoral aid scheme if it is concerned 
by that decision solely by virtue of belonging to the sector in question and 
being a potential benefi ciary of the scheme’.81
The same reasoning applies to standing by associations, which are ‘as a 
rule, entitled to bring an action for annulment against a fi nal Decision of 
the Commission in matters of State aid only if the undertakings which it 
represents or some of those undertakings themselves have locus standi or 
if it can prove an interest of its own’. In Territorio Histórico de Álava the 
Court stated that:
the adoption of a broad interpretation of the right of associations to intervene 
is intended to facilitate assessment of the context of such cases whilst avoiding 
multiple individual interventions which would compromise the eff ectiveness 
and proper course of the procedure.82
Since standing is to the benefi t of the individual claiming it, the burden of 
proof falls onto third parties to show the individual eff ect in view of the 
market situation in the concrete case. All relevant information has there-
fore to be placed before the Court for evaluation.
II.ii.d. Overall remarks on standing and reviewability of acts
The construction of the State aid procedure as a procedure between the 
Commission and Member States appears to internalise some peculiarities 
of State aid control which date back to the period preceding the adop-
tion of Regulation 659/1999. First, the identifi cation of reviewable acts 
in principle covers decisions addressed to Member States concerning 
State measures.83 Second, according to Article 108 TFEU, third parties 
could enjoy procedural rights only once, and if a formal investigation 
is opened. This in principle imposed the heavy burden of the Plaumann 
test for standing to actions for annulment of decisions clearing the State 
measure at the end of the preliminary examination.84 In State aid proce-
dure, third parties are actually considered as mere sources of informa-
tion85 and do not enjoy the status of parties in the procedure. Even the 
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exercise of procedural rights, which follows the opening of formal inves-
tigations, is conceived as a means principally to ensure the full stream of 
information.86
Such shortcomings in the construction of the procedure appeared 
to directly impact upon the function of third parties as information 
providers, reducing the participation of the latter in the procedure 
and thereby substantively ostracising their potential contributions. As 
already observed, the outcome of this has been the uncertainty as to the 
identifi cation of Commission Decisions, which prompted the Courts’ 
searching for remedies against a Decision- making too lacking in crucial 
information. In light of this, the rebalancing of third parties’ rights 
entailed by the solutions envisaged by the EU judicature is not exclu-
sively to be considered as a purpose itself, but as a means to ensure the 
eff ective application of the relevant State aid rules. Importantly, this 
purpose appears to be common in all the case law on reviewability of 
acts and standing.87
It must be noted that, notwithstanding the praetorian nature of these 
advancements, the Courts have carefully stuck to the relevant rules and 
the precedents in case law, so as to ensure consistency with the existing 
procedural rules and continuity in the jurisprudence.88 This comprehensi-
ble need for consistency is partly the basis of the great complexity which 
characterises the solutions elaborated by the Courts on these issues.89 
The admissibility criteria actually may diff er depending on whether the 
Decision has been adopted before or after the opening of a formal inves-
tigation on the aid. The standing rights further depend on whether the 
plaintiff  only challenges the non- opening of such an in- depth procedure or 
also the material grounds of a contested decision. This is a situation which 
is diffi  cult to reconcile with the principle of legal certainty, a key element 
of the rule of law. Advocate General Jacobs stressed this point by stating 
that access to the Court, is ‘an area in which, more than in any other, the 
law must be clear and consistent’.90 One of the many practical suggestions 
was made by Advocate General Bot in Kronofrance in which he suggested 
that the Court:
make the case law more straightforward and consistent, by defi ning the condi-
tions of the admissibility of actions brought against State aid decisions only in 
relation to the purpose of the action, not in relation to the pleas in law invoked 
in support of it.91
This in turn stresses how, notwithstanding its important achievements, 
judicial review in this particular area of State aid is not capable of fully 
replacing legislation in the fi eld. It is time the legislation addressed these 
serious shortcomings of the procedural rules.92
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III. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of Commission’s Decisions in State aid matters is a central 
tool of holding the Commission accountable. Judicial review, generally 
being a key notion to a system of checks and balances and maintaining the 
rule of law, is especially relevant in State aid matters, given the far reach-
ing investigatory and adjudicatory decision- making powers bundled in the 
hands of the Commission.93
To what extent judicial review takes place vis- à- vis State aid Decisions 
by the Commission remains unclear when looking at Article 263 TFEU 
which merely contains a list of grounds of review: lack of competence, 
infringement of essential procedural requirements, infringement of the 
Treaty or of any rule of law in relation to its application or misuse of 
powers.94 This list stems from the origins of Article 263 TFEU which was 
initially modelled on the recours pour exces de pouvoir before the French 
Conseil d’Etat. Since its founding days, the EU legal order has strongly 
evolved. What is left is the original wording which is now little but a 
shell since the notion of infringement of the Treaty of any rule deriving 
thereof virtually covers any case one might be able to think of.95 In today’s 
reality, the key term indicating whether European Courts will engage in 
only marginal review,96 or more fully review a Commission Decision, is 
the notion of discretion.97 This is not a static concept and in the recent 
dynamic case law of the Courts has developed quite complex distinctions 
and  particularities, which will be subject of this part of the chapter.
III.i.  Delegation of Decision- making Powers and the Latest Defi nition of 
Discretion
Delegation of decision- making powers comes in many forms. Delegation 
of the most far reaching powers to the administration is often referred to 
as ‘wide discretion.’98 Discretion can be defi ned as the conferral of power 
to take decisions within legally defi ned limits regarding content and pro-
cedure. Key to this notion is that the administration is granted powers to 
decide about the substance of a certain policy99 also with a view to future 
situations.100 It exists where the broad nature of the provision applied or 
the analytical process required to subsume the facts of the case under such 
powers leaves room for either cognitive assessment to appreciate the rel-
evance of factors or volititive assessment such as policy considerations.101 
These responsibilities are in the case law often addressed as matters of spe-
cifi c ‘complexity’.102 The notion of complexity is used as short- hand for the 
requirement to undertake a balancing decision taking into account a com-
bination of various facts, evaluations of future developments of facts, as 
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well as interests and rights.103 Despite this, one might legitimately wonder 
why the fact that a matter contains economically or technically complex 
considerations should put it beyond the intellectual reach of a Court.104 
After all, one would expect judges to be generally capable of reviewing 
a Commission fi le and reconstructing complex situations and their legal 
assessment.105 What lies behind the misleading term of ‘complexity’ is 
actually a separation of powers consideration that policy decisions or deci-
sions based on specifi c non- legal expertise should be taken by the institu-
tions which have a competence and the mandate to do so.106
Generally, the main consequence of the European Courts’ fi nding that 
an institution enjoys broad discretion is that the so called ‘manifest error 
of assessment’ test is applicable.107 This test indicates that instead of a full 
review, the Court will undertake a restricted degree of review under which 
it will confi ne itself ‘to verifying whether the Commission complied with the 
relevant rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons, whether 
the facts on which the contested fi nding was based have been accurately 
stated and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or a 
misuse of powers’.108 However, on the other hand, where no discretionary 
powers have been delegated, that is, no conferral of expedient judgment 
or evaluation of policies has taken place, administrative decisions are 
submitted to full review.109 This means that the Courts should fully review 
interpretations of the delegating act, the determination of the facts and the 
ultimate holding that the statutory prerequisites have been met, or not.
Although there is a tendency in the case law to declare either a marginal 
or a full review,110 the case law of the European Courts in reality puts less 
emphasis on a clear defi nition of theoretical notions. Instead, it aims at 
adapting the degree of judicial review to the situation.111 Thus the distinc-
tions between wide discretion, discretion and non- discretion are fl uid, and 
also depend on factors such as the question of whether the situation is one 
of legislative or administrative context. The true nature of the extent of 
judicial review is thus found not by the labelling as a power to be discre-
tionary (or not) but as to the eff ective exercise of judicial review underlying 
a specifi c case.
In State aid cases, the identifi cation of cases where discretion exists is 
especially relevant in the context of the defi nition of an aid under Article 
107 TFEU. The Courts held that the concept of aid is objective, the test 
being whether a State measure confers an advantage on one or more 
particular undertakings.112 Here, the Commission assesses situations in 
interpretation of the law without enjoying discretion, ‘save for particular 
circumstances owing to the complex nature of the State intervention in 
question’.113 These particular circumstances have been found by the case 
law for example in areas in which the Commission, in order to determine 
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whether investment by the public authorities in the capital of an undertak-
ing, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU, con-
siders the so- called ‘private investor test’.114 Further, since in view of the 
Courts, in the evaluation of State aids under Article 107(3) TFEU and in 
some cases of Article 107(2) TFEU the Commission must rely on ‘complex 
economic, social, regional and sectoral assessments,’ and therefore its 
Decisions are to be covered by the notion of broad discretion.115 In recent 
years, however, a tendency in the case law of the Courts can be observed 
to increase the level of its judicial review. Two contributing factors may be 
identifi ed leading to this trend.
The fi rst factor is the approach of reviewing administrative activity 
including discretionary activity through information- related general prin-
ciples of law such as the duty of care.116 Under this principle, an admin-
istrative decision- maker, even when granted wide discretion, must make 
the decision after considering all the relevant factors, including special 
circumstances aff ecting the matter.117 The Courts review whether all of the 
‘relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to 
regulate’ have been taken into consideration, and whether the institution 
‘was able, without exceeding the bounds of the broad discretion it enjoys 
in the matter, to reach the conclusion’ it had drawn.118
The duty of care is thus a principle allowing the Courts to review the 
quantity and to a certain degree the quality of the information taken 
into account by the Commission in a State aid Decision, as can be 
seen for example in Sytraval. The applicant in the case challenged the 
Commission’s Decision rejecting a complaint about the grant of a loan 
and raise of capital to a competitor wholly controlled by the French State. 
The General Court had established an expansive reading of the obliga-
tions the Commission was under, by stating that under the duty of care, 
the Commission deciding whether to enter into a second phase of a State 
aid case, in which the complainant would have had a procedural role to 
present its arguments, had the ‘automatic obligation to examine the objec-
tions which the complainant would certainly have raised if it had been 
given the opportunity of taking cognizance of that information.’119 Upon 
appeal of this far reaching view, the CJEU confi rmed this by fi nding that 
the Commission could be required ‘to conduct a diligent and impartial 
examination of the complaint, which may make it necessary for it to 
examine matters not expressly raised by the complainant.’120 Also, where 
the Commission has entered into a formal investigation, the duty of care 
obliges the administration maturing a case towards a fi nal decision to 
conduct its investigation with ‘the requisite care, seriousness and diligence 
so as to be able to assess with full knowledge of the case the factual and 
legal particulars submitted for its appraisal.’121
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A second, related, tendency to expansion of judicial review arises by 
expanding the notion of reviewable ‘facts’ including applied economic 
theory, and thus reducing the margin of appreciation which has been sub-
mitted to only marginal or limited review.122 This case law has been devel-
oped on the back of the duty to give reasons. In practice this means that 
where the Court fi nds in the analysis of the Commission, contradictions, 
insuffi  cient analysis and substantiation of the relevant facts underlying the 
Decision,123 even in an area giving rise to complex economic assessments, 
the Court will not ‘refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation 
of information of an economic nature.’124 As a consequence, the Courts 
distinguish the measure of judicial review from the verifi cation of the 
quantity and quality of the evidence off ered to meet the required standard 
of proof.
Combining these two approaches, the case law of the CJEU has identi-
fi ed several factors to be taken into account. These include fi rst, to analyse 
whether the evidence relied on by the institution, was ‘factually accu-
rate, reliable and consistent.’125 Secondly, the Court will have to review, 
whether the evidence presented by the institution in support of its Decision 
‘contains all the information which must be taken into account in order 
to assess a complex situation.’ Finally, the institution must show that it is 
‘capable of substantiating the conclusions’ drawn from this information.126
This standard of review allows the Courts to enter deeply into the rea-
soning of the Commission in a given administrative Decision, in this case, 
a State aid Decision. The standard of review is based on a complex obli-
gation of gathering information and the use thereof. These information- 
related obligations are thus drawn from general principles of law which 
are upheld also in the presence of a wide margin of discretion of an institu-
tion. The CJEU refers to these as ‘procedural guarantees of fundamental 
importance.’127
The application of the duty of care combined with far reaching obli-
gations of reasoning have reduced the power of the notion of ‘marginal 
review’ to infl ict limitations on the degree of judicial review of Commission 
Decisions in State aid matters. This is an appropriate approach of the 
Courts in view of the administrative nature of the Commission’s exercise 
of discretionary powers.
Not surprisingly, the test applied by the Courts in review of the factual 
basis for the exercise of discretion under the duty of care, closely resem-
bles the Courts’ three- step test of proportionality. The obligation under 
the duty of care is linked to the principle of proportionality in so far as 
it imposes ‘an obligation on Community institutions at least to satisfy 
themselves that the proposed measures are prima facie adequate to attain 
the legitimate aims pursued.’128 The CJEU can thus use the information 
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collected by the Commission for the judicial review of all three steps of 
the proportionality test: fi rst, the capability of a measure to contribute to 
reaching a legitimate policy goal; secondly, the review whether the least 
onerous measure vis- à- vis the Member States’ prerogatives and individual 
rights has been chosen; thirdly, the overall balancing for exclusion of 
extreme cases of imbalance between means and objectives. Given the con-
stitutional basis of the proportionality principle under Article 5(4) TEU, it 
is a principle very well suited to limit the unwritten concept of the extent of 
discretionary powers of the Commission in administrative procedures.129
III.ii. Self- limitation of discretion
An important and typical issue arising from the existence of discretionary 
power is the degree to which the administration can bind itself, in eff ect 
restricting its own discretionary range. The most important general prin-
ciples of law leading to a self- limitation of administrative discretionary 
powers are the principles of equality, legal certainty and legitimate expec-
tations. In the last few decades, the case law of the CJEU has developed 
these general principles of law as a question of self- limitation of discre-
tion.130 ‘Self- binding’ of the Commission can be discussed in at least fi ve 
categories: fi rst, by the establishment of a decisional practice of an admin-
istration, second, by creating (internal) administrative guidelines, third, 
by publishing the information that the Commission intends to follow a 
certain approach and, fourth, by entering into administrative agreements 
and, fi fth, by publication of information.
With regard to the fi rst three categories, internal administrative guide-
lines may be used by an institution to lay down ‘policy rules’ for the exer-
cise of its discretion as a refl ection of ‘the Commission’s desire to publish 
directions on the approach it intends to follow.’131 They are ‘an instance of 
the exercise of its discretion and requires only a self- imposed limitation of 
that power’,132 helping to ensure that an institution ‘acts in a manner which 
is transparent, foreseeable and consistent with legal certainty’.133 Judicial 
review of the Commission’s exercise of discretion will thus include consid-
ering whether it has observed guidelines which the Commission itself has 
laid down and published either vis- à- vis the Member States or the wider 
public.134
With respect to the fourth possibility of self- limitation of discretionary 
powers by agreement, the CJEU has developed these notions for example 
in its case law on Article 108(1) TFEU which provides for agreements 
‘from which neither the Commission nor a Member State can release 
itself’.135 But also self- limitation of discretion by publicised information 
has been accepted by the case law as a possible method of self- limitation 
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of discretionary powers. For instance, self- binding can also take place 
through information tools. The diff erence between pure information and 
binding administrative guidelines can however be fl uid.136 The approach 
of the Courts is well established by CIRFS,137 in which the Court assessed 
a case where the Commission had made a Decision, contrary to its own 
administrative rule, that a particular undertaking need not submit a notifi -
cation in respect of State aids received. The CJEU held that the rules relat-
ing to a particular economic sector which the Commission had established 
in a communication on this policy area (a so- called discipline) and which 
were also accepted by the Member States, have a binding eff ect. They have 
to be seen as constituting ‘a measure of general application and may not 
be impliedly amended by an individual decision.’138 The Commission is 
bound by the Guidelines and Notices that it issues in the area of supervi-
sion of State aid where they do not depart from the rules in the Treaty 
and are accepted by the Member States and the parties may thus rely on 
these.139 The reasons for this are the principles of equal treatment and pro-
tection of legitimate expectations. This determination shows very impor-
tantly also that the principle of equality also applies to EU institutions.
III.iii. Review of Discretion in Supervisory Cases: BUPA
The Commission’s power to review the legality of aid to be granted by 
Member States in the context of State aid control under Article 108 
TFEU, becomes an interesting constellation for example in the area of 
Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) where in turn the Member 
States have the power to establish and defi ne such services in the context of 
national law (for further discussion see chapter 13). These constellations 
are characterised by a multiple step procedure. In the fi rst step, gener-
ally the Member State institutions enjoy discretion to determine a special 
legal regime for an SGEI.140 The second step consists of the Commission’s 
supervision of the decisions taken on SGEIs in the context of Article 
108(2) and (3) TFEU.
In these contexts, two questions arise with respect to discretionary 
decision- making. The fi rst question is the extent of the supervision powers. 
To what degree of control may the Commission subject the original deci-
sion by a Member State institution? The second question is to what degree 
the supervisory decision of the Commission itself is subject to review 
and how much discretion the supervisory body enjoys in the context of 
its supervision. At stake is, on one hand, the extent of the Commission’s 
power to take supervisory decisions, and, on the other hand, the freedom 
of action available to Member States.
In State aids the General Court has held that the review of the 
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Commission’s supervisory assessment of Member State compliance with 
EU law, in itself must be confi ned to ascertaining whether the Commission 
properly found or rejected the existence of a manifest error by the Member 
State.141 Supervisory powers by the Commission are ‘limited to ascertain-
ing whether there is a manifest error or assessment’.142 The Commission 
will review whether the factual premises on which a Member State deci-
sion is based is ‘manifestly erroneous and whether, second, the system is 
manifestly inappropriate for achieving the objectives pursued.’143
In this framework, the Commission itself enjoys discretion for taking 
its supervisory decisions if and so far as the supervision activity contains 
complex economic and ecologic assessments. As a consequence, judicial 
review of supervisory decisions by the Commission is limited:
In such a context, review by the Court consists in ascertaining that the 
Commission complied with the rules of procedure and the rules relating to 
the duty to give reasons and also that the facts relied on were accurate and 
that there has been no error of law manifest error of assessment or misuse of 
powers.144
In other words, a Court review of the supervisory decision by the 
Commission will assess whether the Commission’s assessment of the 
Member State decision is ‘suffi  ciently plausible’.145
Inextricably linked to this limitation of Commission review of a Member 
State decision, where the Member State enjoys discretion, is the burden of 
proof. Even where a Member State enjoys discretion as to the choice of a 
policy, it is obliged to justify its choice with respect to its compliance with 
requirements under Union law. The General Court held in BUPA that:
in absence of such reasons, even a marginal review by the Community institu-
tions (. . .) with respect to a manifest error by the Member State in the context 
of this discretion would not be possible.146
On the other hand, the Commission is obliged to prove the manifest error 
of the Member State on the basis of erroneous facts and assessments or 
implausibility of the result established on this factual basis.147
When seeing this case law in context, it will not escape the readers’ 
attention that the case law of the European Courts with respect to these 
multi- level situations is probably not completely established. After all, 
the same reasons for controlling the Commission’s exercise of discretion 
through an analysis of the information taken into account under the duty 
of care, when applied by the Commission would also require future justi-
fi cation by the Member States of their exercise of powers to defi ne SGEIs. 
This would consequently empower the Commission to analyse whether all 
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relevant facts were taken into consideration, whether the Member State 
could have drawn the conclusions therefrom and whether the possible 
conclusions supportinged the fi nal result.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Most of the problematic issues regarding the structure of judicial review of 
Commission decisions in EU State aid control refer to issues of informa-
tion. EU State aid control is an eminently political policy fi eld, in which 
the Commission has been granted a very powerful role to establish itself 
as reviewer of a host of highly sensitive policy areas, key to the exercise of 
public powers in the Member States. The system which has been established 
in the EU enhances accountability of Member States’ exercise of their 
powers by requiring them to justify their activity and off er information 
about objectives, eff ects and analysis of their activities. It equally requires 
the Commission in the exercise of its control powers to be open to account-
ability by justifi cation of its decision- making and reasoning. The notion of 
information and the rights associated with it through general principles of 
law increasingly enforced by the European Courts is thus the key to under-
standing modern judicial review in State aid procedures as well as, we may 
add, actually more generally EU administrative law. This is the theme under 
which simplifi cation and rationalisation of the case law of the Courts needs 
to be understood. It is an area in which the Courts are visibly struggling 
with adapting the general system of judicial review, especially the annul-
ment procedures, to the specifi c constellation of participants and individual 
rights arising in State aid procedures.148 Problems with regard to the issue 
of standing arise in no small part due to the specifi city that the procedure de 
jure takes place between the EU Commission and one or several Member 
States, but de facto the potential benefi ciaries and their competitors have 
not only a legal but also an economic interest in the outcome of the pro-
ceedings between the Commission and the Member States. Complexity of 
the case law on judicial review in State aid matters further arises from the 
variation of possible tools the Commission can employ at various stages of 
the procedure, ranging from pure publication of information, to binding 
decisions on Member States and fi nally concluding agreements with one or 
several Member States. Such factors contribute to a growing complexity in 
the case law. Such complexity results in dangers to plaintiff s, requiring ever 
more specialised legal advice to navigate the various dangers of formulat-
ing and forwarding one plea rather than another.
Simplifi cation would be key to increasing the transparency of the policy 
area. Guiding principles for a reform may arise not least from the principle 
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of good administration, as Advocate General Mengozzi most recently 
reconfi rmed.149 Good administration is thus the theme which should 
govern decisions about the degree of judicial review refl ecting an increas-
ing awareness for general principles of EU law and the role that these play 
in shaping the legal system.
NOTES
  1. Annulment procedures are brought under Article 263 TFEU against Commission 
Decisions and, exceptionally, also against decisions of the Council in Article 108(2) 
3 paragraph TFEU. Jurisdiction is split between the CJEU General Court, with 
the General Court having jurisdiction for all actions for annulment by individual 
claimants under Article 263 4th paragraph TFEU and the CJEU having jurisdic-
tion for claims by privileged actors, especially Member States, under Article 263 2nd 
paragraph TFEU and for preliminary reference procedures referred to it by national 
courts under Article 267 TFEU. Further the CJEU has jurisdiction for actions 
brought by the Commission against Member State acts or omissions under Article 
108(2) 2nd paragraph TFEU.
  2. Thereby the contribution does not explicitly address actions for failure to act (Article 
265 TFEU), preliminary reference procedures by Member State courts (Article 267 
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Commission [2006] E.C.R. I- 5479, para. 70. For an exhaustive summary of the limits 
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 45. See Quigley 2009: 691. See Case 730/79, Philip Morris [1980] E.C.R. 2671 para. 5. 
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actual benefi ciaries could exist only once the grant of the aid took place. The Court 
did not take an express position on the point, but did not endorse the solution recom-
mended by the Advocate General. This new approach has been confi rmed in Case 
C- 487/06P, British Aggregates Association v. Commission [2008] E.C.R. I- 10505, para. 
35.
 46. Article 3 of Regulation 659/1999. For a concise and exhaustive review of the standstill 
obligation in State aid, see Grespan 2008:576.
 47. See C- 312/90, Spain v. Commission [1992] E.C.R. I- 4117, para. 22- 25; T- 246/99, 
Tirrenia v. Commission, Order of 27 December 2007, para. 43.
 48. See Case T- 141/03, Sniace v. Commission [2005] E.C.R. II- 1197, para. 25–26.
 49. Article 26(1) of Regulation 659/1999.
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not forget that undertakings challenging a decision not to raise ‘objections’, in general, 
as to what concerns the aid, do not enjoy more than the elements communicated by 
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costs of production for the benefi ciaries, the evolution of market shares or the impact 
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plaintiff  is required only to demonstrate that it is in a position of being an eff ective, 
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tion of Decisions fl awed to a certain extent. The fact that the Courts have annulled 
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Matra v. Commission [1993] E.C.R. I- 3203, para. 16; Case C- 390/06, Nuova Agricast 
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[2005] E.C.R. I- 10737, paras. 65–67; Joined Cases C- 75/05 and 80/05, Germany 
v. Kronofrance [2008] E.C.R. I- 6619, para. 42- 45; Case T- 388/02, Kronoply v. 
Commission [2008] E.C.R. II- 305, paras. 77–78.
 62. See Case C- 78/03P, Commission v. Aktiongemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum [ARE] 
[2005] E.C.R. I- 10737, paras. 44–45 and 65–67.
 63. Case T- 266/94, Skibsvaerftsforeningen and Others v. Commission [1996] E.C.R. II- 
1399, para. 45; T- 212/00, Nuove industrie molisane v. Commission [2002] E.C.R. II- 
347, para. 45; T- 30/03, SID v. Commission [2007] E.C.R. II- 34, para. 40.
 64. In Case T- 114/00, Aktiongemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum v. Commission [2002] 
E.C.R. II- 5121, para. 49, the General Court held that: ‘The pleas for annulment put 
forward in support for the present action. . . must be construed as seeking to establish 
that the measures at issue pose serious diffi  culties as regards their compatibility with 
the common market, diffi  culties which place the Commission under an obligation 
to initiate the formal proceedings’. Also see, in this respect, Case C- 198/91, Cook v. 
Commission [1993] E.C.R. I- 2487; Case C- 225/91, Matra v. Commission [1993] E.C.R. 
I- 3203.
 65. See Case T- 210/02, British Aggregates v. Commission [2008] E.C.R. II- 2789, para. 54; 
C- 319/07 P, 3F v. Commission [2009] E.C.R. I- 5963, para. 78.
 66. Case C- 319/07P, 3F v. Commission [2009] E.C.R. I- 5963, paras. 78–81. In the Order 
of the General Court in Case T- 30/03, SID v. Commission [2007] E.C.R. II- 34 (sub-
sequently appealed by the trade organisation 3F in 3F v. Commission), the General 
Court declared the application inadmissible by reason of applicant’s failure to satisfy 
the Plaumann test, notwithstanding its being a party concerned according to the 
meaning of Cook and Matra. In the Opinion of AG Sharpston of 5 March 2009 in 
Case C- 319/07 P, 3F v. Commission [2009] E.C.R. I- 5963, para. 35, AG Sharpston 
expressed her worries that the rulings in Aktiongemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum and 
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British Aggregates might imply the application of the Plaumann test for standing 
already in proceedings brought against Decisions adopted at the end of preliminary 
examination: ‘The BAA case was notable in that the applicant there had challenged 
a decision not to initiate a review on the grounds both that its procedural rights had 
been infringed and that the Commission had erred on the merits of the decision. The 
Court considered together on appeal all the pleas in law raised by the applicant before 
the Court of First Instance. It seems from that judgment that if a party includes in 
its challenge a plea as to the merits of the decision itself, the test for standing to be 
applied is that set out in Plaumann and the subsequent line of case- law. Furthermore, 
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the pleas in law brought before it so that, were the applicant in question not to meet 
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 67. Case C- 319/07 P, 3F v. Commission [2009] E.C.R. I- 5963, para. 78.
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interpret the pleas of the parties [as determined in Commission v. Aktiongemeinschaft 
Recht und Eigentum] does not aff ect its capacity to examine the arguments on sub-
stance presented by the applicant, with a view to determine whether they could 
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142. Ibid, para. 169.
143. Ibid, para. 266.
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